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DOES EMPLOYER IMPLEMENTATION OF EMPLOYEE
PRODUCTION TEAMS VIOLATE SECTION 8 (a) (2)
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT?
Sections 2(5) and 8(a) (2) of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) 1 establish the ambits of permissible employer involvement
1. The National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§
151-68 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as NLRA or the Act]. Section 2(5) provides:
The term "labor organization" means any organization of any kind, or any
agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees par-
ticipate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with
employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of
employment, or conditions of work.
Id. § 152(5).
Section 8(a) (2) provides:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration
of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to
it: Provided, That subject to rules and regulations made and published
by the Board pursuant to section 156 of this title, an employer shall
not be prohibited from permitting employees to confer with him during
working hours without loss of time or pay ....
Id. § 158(a) (2).
It has been contended that § 9(a) of the NLRA, id. § 159(a), is also relevant to the
question of employer involvement with certain types of labor organizations, but the
Supreme Court rejected that contention in NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203
(1959). The relevant portion of § 9(a) provides:
[A]ny individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any
time to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances ad-
justed, without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the
adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract
or agreement then in effect: Provided further, That the bargaining representa-
tive has been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment.
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970). In Cabot Carbon respondents argued that this section ex-
empted employer-created grievance committees from the proscription of § 8(a) (2). In
rejecting the argument the Supreme Court used the following language, which strongly
suggests that the employer-employee contact permitted by § 9(a) is that initiated by the
employees as individuals or informal groups, not the regular contact between a formal
employee organization and the employer:
The amendment to § 9(a) does not say that an employer may form or maintain
an employee committee for the purpose of "dealing with" the employer, on be-
half of employees, concerning grievances. On the contrary the amendment to
§ 9(a) simply provides, in substance, that any individual employee or group of
employees shall have the right personally to present their own grievances to
their employer, and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention
of any bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent
with the terms of any collective bargaining contract then in effect, provided
that the bargaining representative, if there is one, has been given an opportunity
to be present. It is thus evident that there is nothing in the amendment of
§ 91(a) that authorizes an employer to engage in "dealing with" an employer-
dominated "labor organization" as the representative of his employees concern-
ing their grievances.
360 U.S. at 217-18. For discussions of the § 9(a) argument, see Feldman & Steinberg,
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with a labor organization. These sections were designed to maintain
the independence of employee organizations in order to ensure the fair
operation of the collective bargaining process, and they presuppose the
existence of employers and employees as separate entities with conflicting
interests.2 In applying these sections, the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) and the courts have traditionally focused upon the ques-
tions of what constitutes a labor organization, and what specific indicia
of employer involvement amount to illegal support, domination and inter-
ference. Recent employer efforts to redesign the conventional workplace,
by organizing employees into production teams and giving those teams
the responsibility of making recommendations or decisions about certain
aspects of production as well as certain terms and conditions of employ-
ment, have added a new dimension to analysis under these sections.
Although the efforts of Swedish manufacturers, particularly Volvo,
to introduce team production have perhaps received the widest public at-
tention, several American companies have also implemented the team form
of production in recently built plants.' A major difference between the
Swedish and American organizational changes, however, is that the
Swedish plans are the joint product of the employers and the unions,
whereas in the United States the plans, for the most part, have been
unilaterally implemented by the employer in a nonunion context.,
This note will describe a representative model of the team as an
organizational form and will explore the issue whether an employer's
implementation of such a plan in a nonunion context may constitute
illegal domination of a labor organization under §§ 2(5) and 8(a) (2) of
the NLRA.
Employee-Management Committees and the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 35
Ttm. L. REv. 365 (1961); Sangerman, Employee Committees: Can. They Survive Under
the Taft-Hartley Act?, 24 LAB. L.J. 684 (1973).
2. See Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND. L.J. 319, 322
(1951) [hereinafter cited as Cox] ; Getman, The Protection of Economic Pressure by
SectiOn 7 of tire National Labor Relations Act, 115 U. PA. L REv. 1195, 1212-13 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Getman].
3. The American companies leading this movement towards redesign of the work-
place are Proctor & Gamble, General Foods and TRW Systems. See Jenkins, Denwc-
racy in the Factory, 231 ATLANTIC, April 1973, at 78 [hereinafter cited as Jenkins] ; Wal-
ton, How to Counter Alienation in the Plant, 50 HARV. Bus. REv., Nov.-Dec. 1972, at 70[hereinafter cited as Walton].
4. For discussions of the Swedish situation, see Carson, Preparing Workers for
Participation, 28 INT'L MGT., Jan. 1973, at 44; Walton, supra note 3, at 80. For discus-
sions of the particular suitability of the team and related theories of management for
nonunion plants, see Myers, Overcoming Union Opposition to Job Enrichment, 49 HARV.




To combat the growing alienation among employees, manifested by
industrial strife, high rates of personnel turnover, absenteeism, and low
productivity,5 several employers have attempted to redesign the workplace
in accordance with new theories of management. One such theory, par-
ticipative decisionmaking, attempts to enhance the meaning of an
employee's involvement in and sense of responsibility for his job.' The
fullest implementation of the theory of participative decisionmaking re-
quires a major organizational redesign of traditional plant operations.7
The organizational model most widely discussed in the United States is
that which assigns production employees into a number of teams which
are delegated certain decisionmaking responsibility along with their pro-
ductive tasks.'
Plants utilizing the team concept commonly assign all production
employees into a number of teams with responsibility for an entire segment
of plant operations delegated to each.' Each team usually has a team
5. See Adams, Living with Automation if Winnipeg, in WORKERS' CONTROL 26 (G.
Hunnius, G. Garson & J. Case eds. 1973) [hereinafter cited as WORKERS' CONTROL]
worker's perspective) ; Hampden-Turner, The Factory as an Oppressive and Non-Einan-
cipatory Environment, in WORKER' CONTROL, supra, at 30 (social scientist's perspective) ;
Herzberg, Swapping Managerial Garbage, 175 INDUS. WEEK, Oct. 2, 1972, at 40 (man-
agement theorist's perspective).
6. See Edel & van der Loeff, Participation-Industrial Devwcracy: Constraints and
Possibilities, 11 MGT. INT'L REv., Apr.-May 1971, at 141; Powell & Schlacter, Participa-
tive Management-A Panacea?, 14 ACADEMY OF MGT. J. 165 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Powell & Schlacter]; Walton, supra note 3. For discussions of other closely related
theories, i.e., job enlargement or enrichment and productivity bargaining, see THE SCAN-
LON PLAN: A FRONTIER IN LASOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION (F. Lesieur ed. 1958);
Hulin & Blood, Job Enlargement, Individual Differences, and Worker Responses, 69
PSYCHOLOaICAL BULL. 41 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Hulin & Blood] ; Scott, Job En-
largeinent-The Key to Increasing Job Satisfaction?, 52 PERSONNEL J. 313 (1973) ; Sus-
man, Job Enlargement: Effects of Culture on Worker Responses, 12 INDUS. RELATIONS,
Feb. 1973, at 1.
7. See Walton, supra note 3, at 72-74.
8. See, e.g., Walton, supra note 3.
The models also implement the theory of job enlargement on a major scale. This
theory has been defined as
the process of allowing individual workers to determine their own pace (within
limits), to serve as their own inspectors by giving them responsibility for quality
control, to repair their own mistakes, to be responsible for their own machine
setup and repair, and to attain choice of method.
Hulin & Blood, sutpra note 6, at 41-42. However, as it is the implementation of par-
ticipative decisionmaking that raises the legal issues explored in this note, the discussion
has been limited to that theory.
9. For example, in a pet food plant which has implemented the team concept, plant
operations have been divided between two teams comprised of seven to fourteen em-
ployees and including a team leader. One team is assigned to processing the product
which includes unloading and storing materials, drawing ingredients from storage and
combining them to make the pet food product. The other team packages the product,
stores it in the warehouse, and ships it. Walton, supra note 3, at 74.
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leader, either appointed by management or elected by the team members.1
In addition to its productive tasks, each team is given the responsibility
for making recommendations or decisions about some or all of the follow-
ing matters:
(1) individual job assignments;
(2) interviewing job applicants and hiring;
(3) establishing and changing work rules;
(4) evaluation of individual job performance;
(5) progression within the compensation system;
(6) coping with manufacturing problems that occur within or
between the team's areas of responsibility;
(7) selecting team operators to serve on plant-wide committees or
task forces.11
Deliberation on problems falling within these areas occurs routinely in
conjunction with the team members' performance of their productive
-tasks. The teams are purposely structured, both in terms of size and as-
signed functions, to facilitate a high degree of team member interaction
-which serves as the basis for recommendations or decisions. 2
With some decisional authority delegated by the company to the
team, this form of organization is designed to change the structure of the
traditional employee-employer relationship by minimizing distinctions
between employees and employers as separate identifiable groups with in-
dependent and conflicting interests. Instead, this plan attempts to sub-
stitute for the more conventional structure a cooperative relationship based
on mutuality of interest and involvement in a common enterprise. 3
10. Id. See also Volvo Press Information 1412-FS/ub-9600-EE/mm, 1973, at 4(on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
11. Walton, siupra note 3, at 74-76.
12. Id. at 74.
13. The mutuality is based on what management theorists perceive as a strong cor-
relation between "enhanced . . . quality of work life for employees" and "improved
productivity." Id. at 81. As one management official expresses it: "Humans will best
respond (be productive) when there exists a high feeling of self-worth by employee, and
employee identification with success of total organization." L. Ketchum, Paper Pre-
-pared for Presenting at "Humanizing of Work Symposium," American Association for
the Advancement of Science Annual Meeting, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Dec. 27, 1971,
at 1 (on file with the Indiana Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Ketchum].
For an argument disputing the existence of this correlation, see Powell & Schlacter,
.mpra note 6. The authors argue that studies attempting to establish the correlation have
all been conducted in environments where increased productivity is rewarded by in-
creased compensation. Thus, "it is quite impossible to divorce the effects of participa-
tion from the explicit or implicit economic incentive, which accompanies it." Id. at 166(emphasis omitted). In conducting their own study, the authors attempted to eliminate
economic incentive as a variable and concluded from the results that the correlation
'was not apparent.
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Development of the employees' sense of identification with the com-
pany is crucial to the plan's success. At one plant, for example, the com-
pany, in addition to increasing the employees' participation in decision-
making, has made a conscious effort to reduce the physical symbols of
hierarchy, characteristic of conventional plants, on the premise that
employee involvement with the company is promoted when an employee
is treated as though his place within the organization is an important
one.14
The fundamental conflict between the theory of labor relations under-
lying the team and the basic policies of the NLRA is apparent. The Act
presupposes conflicts of interest and provides the neutral process of col-
lective bargaining to resolve those conflicts. The theory on which the
team is based, however, assumes that the employer can establish a
mutuality of interest through the implementation of the team model. The
resolution of this basic conflict must be made by reference to the specific
provisions of the NLRA dealing with the permissible scope of employer
involvement in employee affairs.
Is THE TEAM A "LABOR ORGANIZATION" UNDER § 2(5) OF THE NLRA?
One of the basic statutory prohibitions designed to assure the full
effectiveness of the collective bargaining process is § 8(a) (2) of the
NLRA"5 which prohibits employer domination of, interference with, or
support of a labor organization. This section is meant to ensure the in-
dependence of labor organizations,16 and it represents the most obvious
legal obstacle to the implementation of the team concept.
Section 8(a) (2) is applicable only where the employer is allegedly
dominating a '"labor organization" as defined by § 2(5)."' Therefore, to
determine whether § 8(a) (2) has any impact on the team concept, the
question whether the team is a "labor organization" must first be ex-
plored. 8
14. "There is an open parking lot, a single entrance for both the office and plant,
and a common decor throughout the reception area, offices, locker rooms, and cafeteria."
Walton, supra note 3, at 76.
15. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2) (1970).
16. Employers may of course confer with the union; but they should not par-
ticipate in its deliberations as an organic entity. The organization itself should
be independent of the employer-employee relationship.
Hearings on S. 1958 Before the Senate Comin. on Education and Labor, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. 41 (1935) (statement of Senator Robert F. Wagner), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTOvY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT, 1935, 1417 (1949) [hereinafter
cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. See also NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co., 308 U.S. 241, 251 (1939).
17. See NLRB v. Cleveland Trust Co., 214 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1954). Section 2(5)
is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1970).
18. Traditionally, the NLRB and the courts have regularly rejected employer de-
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The Structural Requirement of § 2(5)
For an organization to be a "labor organization" within the meaning
of § 2(5), it must meet structural, subject matter, and functional re-
quirements. The structural requirement is met by "any organization of
any kind. in which employees participate. . . ."" Courts have con-
sistently refused to establish any extrastatutory formal requirements for
a labor organization, thus indicating that the statutory provision be read
as broadly as written." Organizations in which employees participate have
been found to qualify as labor organizations where they lacked a formal
structure,2' a constitution or bylaws,22 officers,2" the practice of collecting
dues, 4 or even continuity of existence.2 Accordingly, the team would
seem to qualify.
It might be argued that although the tear. qualifies as an organiza-
tion, it is not an organization in which employees participate. This argu-
ment would be based on the contention that team members, because they
have more decisionmaking responsibility than employees in conventional
plants, are not employees within the meaning of the NLRA. Section 2 (3)
of the NLRA,28 however, defines "employee" very broadly; in order for
team members to be excluded, they would have to qualify as one of the
specifically enumerated exceptions to the definition. Section 2(3) pro-
vides in part:
The term "employee" shall include any employee. . . but
shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural
laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his
home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or
any individual having the status of an independent contractor,
or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual
fenses to domination charges when based on the contention that the organization in ques-
tion was not a labor organization within the meaning of § 2(5). See Note, Section
8(a)(2): Employer Assistance to Plant Unions and Committees, 9 iSTAN. L. REV. 351,
353-54 (1957).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1970).
20. NLRB v. Ampex Corp., 442 F.2d 82 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939
(1971).
21. See, e.g., NLRB v. Stow Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d 900 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 964 (1955) (monthly meetings of all employees, where the president of the
company spoke and then conducted a question and answer period, constituted a labor
organization).
22. See, e.g., Indiana Metal Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 202 F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 1953).
23. See, e.g., Pacemaker Corp. v. NLRB, 260 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1958); NLRB v.
Saxe-Glassman Shoe Corp., 201 F.2d 238 (1st Cir. 1953).
24. See, e.g., Wyman-Gordon Co. v. NLRB, 153 F.2d 480 (7th Cir. 1946).
25. See, e.g., NLRB v. American Furnace Co., 158 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1946).
26. 29 US.C. § 152(3) (1970).
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employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, as
amended from time to time, or by any other person who is not an
employer as herein defined.27
The only one of these exceptions which could possibly cover team mem-
bers is the exception for supervisors. Section 2(11) of the NLRA28 de-
fines "supervisor" in the :following terms:
The term "supervisor" means any individual having
authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or
discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to
adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action,
if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority
is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use
of independent judgment.2 "
Team members collectively do have some responsibility for hiring
new members of the work force, for assigning themselves to various tasks
within their segment of production, and for disciplining individual team
members in the sense of critically evaluating their job performane.
There are, however, two major problems with the position that the
responsibilities of the team members make them supervisors rather than
employees. The first is that although the team as a group has some of the
authority delineated in § 2 (11), no team member possesses such authority
as an individual. The second, and related, problem is that although -a
supervisor need not possess all the enumerated responsibilities of§ 2(11),1 the NLRB has acknowledged supervisory status only where
the individual in question has subordinates to supervise.2 An individual's
authority "responsibly to direct," then, seems to be a necessary prere-
quisite for supervisory status, and in the team context the team members
as individuals do not have such authority since they are all equal in terms
of status and therefore have no subordinates.
A major policy problem with the position that team members should
27. Id.
28. Id. § 152(11).
29. Id.
30. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
31. NLRB v. Gray Line Tours, Inc., 461 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1972) ; NLRB v. Little
Rock Downtowner, Inc., 414 F.2d 1084 (8th Cir. 1969).
32. See, e.g., El Monte Hay Market, Inc., 173 N.L.R.B. 1140 (1968) (hay haulers
not supervisors because the individuals they directed were not employees of the haulers'
employer) ; Safeway Stores, Inc., 103 N.L.R.B. 758 (1953) (head meat cutter not a su-
pervisor because he was the only employee in the meat section).
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be classified as supervisors is that it would permit an employer to remove
all his employees from the protection of the NLRA by delegating to them
a very few of the types of authority delineated in § 2(11). If this position
were adopted, team members who occupy the same socioeconomic position
as conventional employees-they perform the same, basic productive tasks,
receive approximately the same wages, work approximately the same
number of hours, and have approximately the same opportunity for
advancement?---would be denied the protection of the NLRA because they
have been given some voice in hiring new employees, in dividing work
among themselves, and in evaluating the performance of their fellows.
For reasons both of statutory construction and sound policy, team
members should not be classified as supervisors. If, then, they are not
specifically excluded from the statutory definition of "employee," they
qualify as employees, and the team would satisfy the structural require-
ment of a labor organization, as it would be an "organization . . in
which employees participate." 4
The Subject Matter Requirements of § 2(5)
The second requirement that an organization must meet to fall within
§ 2(5) is that its relationship with management concern "grievances,
labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions
of work." 5 In NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co.,8 a case in which the company
was charged with dominating an assortment of employee committees, the
Supreme Court of the United States established that an organization's
concern with only one of these matters satisfies this subject matter re-
quirement. 7 At least two areas of responsibility often delegated to teamsss
appear to meet the requirements of § 2(5). Teams delegated the respon-
sibility for establishing and changing work rules are concerned with items
falling under the § 2(5) category of "conditions of work." Similarly,
teams making decisions about an individual's progression within the com-
pensation system are concerned with subject matter within the headings of
"wages" or "rates of pay." The purpose of participative decisionmaking
which is to give employees a voice in decisions that shape the quality of
life in the workplace, 9 naturally involves team concern with "conditions
of work." Since the subject matter requirement of § 2(5) is met by an
33. See Jenkins, supra note 3.
34. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1970).
35. Id.
36. 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
37. Id. at 213.
38. See text accompanying note 11 smpra.
39. See authorities cited note 6 supra.
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organization dealing with any one of the enumerated subjects, most teams
will meet this requirement.
The Functional Requiyement of § 2(5)
The functional requirement of § 2(5) is met if a team exists "for
the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with" the employer."0 If a
company has purposely involved a team in the determination of § 2(5)
matters, the team, if it does in fact "deal" with the employer, necessarily
exists, at least in part, for that purpose."1
The Court in Cabot Carbon unequivocally established that "dealing
with" did not exclusively mean "bargaining with." Further, it specified
that the term "dealing" encompassed employee recommendations to
management.42 Although the facts of Cabot Carbon did not warrant a
further elaboration on the meaning of "dealing," other courts have found
"dealing" between the employer and a labor organization where the parties
merely discussed § 2(5) subjects43 and, also, where one of the parties
merely asked questions,44 or provided information."
A determination of whether a team "deals with" the employer con-
cerning § 2(5) matters must address two major issues. The first is
whether the participation of the team leader in the team's affairs constitutes
"dealing" between employees and their employer. The second is whether
40. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1970).
41. The NLRB and the courts seem generally to have ignored any subjective sig-
nificance of the word "purpose" in § 2(5) by looking to the factual question whether
"dealing" concerning § 2(5) subjects has occurred, rather than to the intent of either
party. Thus, an organization which was created to work with the employer concerning
management problems was found to be a labor organization because it had, in fact, dealt
with the employer concerning § 2(5) matters. Northeastern Eng'r, Inc.. 112 N.L.R.B
743 (1955). See also NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U,.. 203, 213 (1959). This ap-
proach seems consistent with the legislative intent behind the provision as reflected in
the following Senate report extracts which, at least implicitly, equates "for the purpose
of dealing" with actual "dealing":
The term "labor organization" is phrased very broadly in order that the
independence of action guaranteed by section 7 of the bill and protected by sec-
tion 8 shall extend to all organizations of employees that deal with employers in
regard to "grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment,
or conditions of work."
S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 15, at 2306 (emphasis added).
42. 360 U.S. at 214.
43. NLRB v. Ampex Corp., 442 F.2d 82 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939
(1971) ; NLRB v. General Shoe Corp., 192 F.2d 504 (6th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 904 (1952).
44. NLRB v. Stow Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d 900 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
964 (1955).
45. NLRB v. Standard Coil Prods. Co., 224 F.2d 465 (1st Cir), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 902 (1955).
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the relationship between the team and higher management involves
"dealing" within the meaning of § 2(5).
The first issue has two components: (1) whether the team leader
is an employer within the meaning of the Act; and (2) if he is, whether
his contact with the team members, when that contact concerns § 2(5)
subjects, amounts to "dealing." Section 2(2) of the Act includes within
its definition of employer "any person acting as an agent if an employer,
directly or. indirectly . *."..46 The legislative history of the Taft-
Hartley amendments reflects the congressional intent to give supervisors,
as defined in § 2 (11)," the statuts of an agent of the employer. 8 Thus,
if the team leader qualifies as a supervisor, it would appear that he par-
ticipates in team affairs as an employer.
The determination of supervisory status is made on the basis of the
individual's actual duties, not his or her job title.49 As was indicated above,
the individual, to be a supervisor, need not have all the responsibilites
enumerated in § 2(11)." The normal functions of a team leader, par-
ticularly if appointed by the employer, would seem to indicate that he or
she has the requisite degree of authority to be classified as a supervisor
and thus an agent of the employer. Whereas the team members would not
qualify as supervisors because they lack the authority "responsibly to
direct,"'" the team leader, at least when appointed by the employer, would
seem to possess this authority which has alone been deemed sufficient to
establish supervisory status. 52 One commentator has stated that the team
leader is "largely responsible for team development and group decision
making."53 The team leader has been characterized as a "people man-
ager"5 which indicates an authority "responsibly to direct." And the team
leader may also have the actual responsibility for granting individual team
members raises, implying an employer-team leader agency relationship,
46. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970).
47. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1970).
48. H.R. RxP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1947). The section of the House
Report explaining the rationale for removing supervisors from the protection of the Act
contains the following statements: "Management, like labor, must have faithful agents,"
and "[s]upervisors are management people." Id. (emphasis omitted). The Taft-Hartley
Amendments, ch. 120, § 101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1946),
are popularly known as the Labor-Management Relations Act.
49. See NLRB v. Cooke & Jones, Inc., 339 F.2d 580 (Ist Cir. 1964); NLRB v.
Quincy Steel Casting Co., 200 F.2d 293 (1st Cir. 1952).
50. Cases cited note 31 supra.
51. See text accompanying notes 29 & 32 supra.
52. Ohio Power Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1949); Clark O'Neill, Inc.,
147 N.L.R.B. 370 (1964).
53. Walton, supra note 3, at 75.
54. See Ketchum, supra note 13, at 7.
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even though the subject of the raise is open to discussion by the entire
team.55
If the team leader is an employer for purposes of § 2(5), then his
contact with team members would clearly seem to constitute "dealing"
given the broadness of that term as construed by the courts. The intrateam
contact between the team leader and the other team members is similar to
the employee-employer contact which a number of courts have found to
be "dealing" within the meaning of the statute. Team discussion of work
rules' for example, is not unlike the employee-management committee's
discussion of smoking rules in NLRB v. Standard Coil Products" where
the management committee was found to be a "labor organization" within
the definition of § 2(5). Similarly, any discussion within the team, in
which the team leader participates, would seem to constitute dealing in
the same sense that the general discussion of § 2 (5) matters by the com-
munications committee qualified that committee as a labor organization
in NLRB v. Ampex Corp.17
The issue whether the external relationship between the team and
higher management involves "dealing" in the § 2(5) sense is a more
difficult one. It must be explored, fiowever, in the event that the team
-leader, particularly one elected by the other employees, is not found to be
participating in the team as an agent of the employer, or in the event that
the role of the team leader is eliminated. To determine this issue, it is
important to know exactly what powers the team has. The final product
of team deliberations may be a decision or merely a recommendation.
Therefore, it is necessary to discuss both as possibilities.
If the team makes recommendations to management relating to
§ 2 (5) subjects, the conclusion is apparent. The team would fall squarely
within the Cabot Carbon holding that an organization's act of making
recommendations to the employer constitutes dealing within the meaning
of the statute.5 " If, however, the team makes actual decisions relating to
§ 2(5) matters, the question whether it is "dealing" with the employer
becomes more difficult. For there to be "dealing," there must be contact
between the two parties. Here, it might be argued, no contact occurs.
When the team operates within its delegated domain of responsibility,
management provides no input into the team's decision. Management
does not suggest what the decision should be; it does not even discuss
with the team the issues to be decided. Since the team unilaterally makes
55. See Walton, supra note 3, at 76.
56. 224 F.2d 465 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 902 (1955).
57. 442 F.2d 82 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.,S. 939 (1971).
58. 360 U.S. at 214.
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and implements its decision, it is not "dealing with" the employer.
The problem with this argument is that although the team makes a
totally unilateral decision, that decision is not neoessarily final." Implicit
in the company's delegation of decisionmaking responsibility to the team
is management's ultimate power to review or even overrule the team's
decision. If a team's decision is final in practice, its finality is attributable
not to the team's authority, but to management's ultimate authority
to let the decision stand. Conceptually, it is at least arguable that team deci-
sions subject to review by management amount only to recommendations
which become final when management decides not to exercise its veto. If
this view is accepted, Cabot Carbon would again necessitate a finding that
the team is "dealing" with the employer."0
Another basis for a finding that the team is dealing with manage-
ment, that of discussion with the employer about issues of employment,
is implicit in the employer's ultimate power of review. Practically, the
employer's power to review seems to imply that the team, at least occasion-
ally, would have the burden of justifying its decisions to management per-
sonnel. Any discussions between the team and management in which the
team is required to justify its action would thus constitute "dealing" in
the broad sense of that term which the courts have adopted."1
Conceivably, an employer might avoid a finding that it was engaged
ir "dealing" with a team if it could persuade the NLRB and courts that it
had not and would not exercise its formal power of review and that team
decisions were thus final. In order to make this claim, however, the
employer must have imposed carefully structured limits on the domain of
team decisionmaking responsibility. Assuming that the employer re-
quires a control mechanism of some type over team decisions, in order to
protect itself against the possibility of decisions which undercut the com-
pany's economic position, the employer would have to argue that it had
limited the domain of team decisionmaking so that management was
59. Management's willingness to accept team decisions could well depend on the
decision's impact on plant productivity. The possible tension between productivity and
participative decisionmaking as a method of improving the quality of work life has been
recognized by some of the business commentators.
[M]anagers who concern themselves with [quality of work life for employees
and productivity] will find points at which they must make trade-of fs-i.e., that
they can only enhance the quality of work life at the expense of productivity or
vice versa. What concerns me is that it is easier to measure productivity than
to measure the quality of- work life, and that this fact will bias how trade-off
situations are resolved.
Walton, supra note 3, at 81. See also Powell & Schlacter, supra note 6.
60. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
61. See notes 43-45 supra & text accompanying.
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indifferent to any decision which the team might make within that domain.
Thus review of any particular team decision would be unnecessary.
For example, an employer might design a basic wage ladder for its
employees but give the team the power to decide which team members will
be paid at the various levels. Since the employer has set the limit on total
wage expenditures, it is indifferent to how the employees will divide the
money among themselves. Arguably, the employer has not engaged in
"dealing" with the team concerning wages because it has unilaterally
determined the amount of money which the company will pay as wages,
and it has delegated to the team the full power to make unilateral decisions
about the wage levels of individual employees.
Conceptually, this argument is persuasive. An employer who has
implemented such a plan, however, will face serious practical problems
in realizing the positive features of team organization while maintain-
ing this carefully structured division of decisionmaking, responsibility.
Such a careful divison of authority undercuts a major purpose of imple-
menting the team concept which is to improve employee morale by
decreasing the hierarchal distance between employer and employees. In
the situation described above, the employer, to avoid the deliberations
which would constitute "dealing," would have to issue its unilateral deci-
sions concerning § 2 (5) subject in the form of directives not open to dis-
cussion. Thus communication between the employer and the team would
be marked by an artificial formality inconsistent with the cooperative atmo-
sphere which the team is designed to promote.
Moreover, confining all team decisions about § 2(5) subjects within
employer imposed limits could prevent the employees from developing the
sense of involvement with the company which is a prerequisite to im-
proved productivity. It would seem that, to be truly effective, the team
form of organization would permit employee involvement in more mean-
ingful types of decisions.
The typical team, then, generally will meet the structural and func-
tional requirements of a § 2(5) labor organization, since employees will
be participants and the team will be involved in "dealing with" the
employer regardless of whether a team leader participates in its affairs.
In addition, the subject matter requirements of § 2(5) will be met, for
team involvement in determining "conditions of work" is one of the
primary goals of the concept itself. 2 Thus, since virtually all teams will
satisfy the structural, subject matter, and functional requirements of §
2(5), they will qualify as "labor organizations" and will therefore be
62. See authorities cited note 6 supra.
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subject to the § 8(a) (2) prohibition of employer domination.
IS THE TEAM EMPLOYER DOMINATED UNDER § 8(A) (2) OF THE NLRA?
Section 8(a) (2) of the NLRA provides that it shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer to dominate, contribute financial or
other support to, or interfere with the formation or administration of any
"labor organization." 3 The policy emphasis underlying the application of
this section has shifted somewhat in recent years. The policies initially
deemed pertinent to its application were laid out by the United States
Supreme Court in Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v.
NLRB. 4 There, even though the challenged labor organization had pre-
vented serious labor disputes and had the support of the employees, the
Supreme Court found it dominated because a provision of the plan estab-
lishing the organization gave the employer power to veto the organiza-
tion's projected actions and amendments to the plan.65 The Court held
that the plan's provision constituted
[s]uch control of the form and structure of an employe organi-
zation [as] deprives the employes of the complete freedom of
action guaranteed to them by the Act, and justifies an order
[of disestablishment] as was here entered.6
The policy underlying an interpretation of § 8(a) (2) as guarantee-
ing structural independence of labor organizations is implicit in this state-
ment by the Court. A major purpose of the Act was to allow employees
the freedom to exert economic pressure against the employer in order to
force the employer to agree to terms it would not accept if not economi-
cally coerced."7 The structurally dominated or supported labor organiza-
tion is incapable of launching this kind of economic attack. An employer
63. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2) (1970).
64. 308 U.S. 241 (1939). This case was decided well before the passage of the
Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA in 1947, ch. 120, § 101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
However, as the Supreme Court indicated in NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203
(1959), the conferees on the Taft-Hartley Amendments
specifically rejected all attempts to "amend . . . the provisions in subsection
8(2) [of the original Wagner Act] relating to company-dominated unions" and
had left its prohibitions "unchanged."
Id. at 217, quoting 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELA-
TIONS ACT 1947, 1539 (1948).
65. The difficulty with the position [that the organization was permissible be-
cause it had averted industrial strife and had the support of the employees] is
that the provisions of the statute preclude such a disposition of the case. The
law provides that an employe organization shall be free from interference or
dominance by the employer.
308 U4 S. at 251.
66. 308 U.S. at 249.
67. Getman, supra note 2, at 1195.
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can cripple its effectiveness by disordering its internal operations or with-
drawing its support."8
Moreover, the problem of the structurally dominated labor organi-
zation goes even deeper than its basic vulnerability to employer sabotage.
Not only is such an organization weak, but it also pre-empts the creation,
by the employees, of an independent organization outside the employer's
sphere of influence. Its very existence nurtures employee reliance on a
dispute resolution system which clearly favors the employer because,
unlike true collective bargaining, it does not permit the employees' full
exertion of economic pressure."9
To implement the policy of protecting a labor organization's struc-
tural independence, the NLRB and the courts have strictly scrutinized the
relationship between the employer and the labor organization. They have
found illegal support, for example, where the employer has provided of-
fice facilities7" or clerical assistance," or where the employer has allowed
the organization to meet on company time without deducting from the
68. Weakness of the organization, per se, is not proscribed by the Act.
It is only when the weak and ineffective structure can be traced to the employer,
as by employer drafting of the by-laws or constitution, or when the by-laws
incorporate instruments of employer control, as by veto power over amendments
and decisions, that the functional weaknesses become persuasive evidence of
domination.
Note, Employer-Dominated Unions-llhsory Self-Organization, 40 COLu . L REv. 278,
290 (1940) (footnotes omitted).
69. In this sense the team bears a striking resemblance to an industrial council
found by the NLRB to be a dominated labor organization. Employee representatives on
the Council had equal voting power with the management representatives, and the em-
ployees were participating not because of any employer coercion. The Board askeo
rhetorically:
But, in any real sense, can the Harvester Industrial Couhcil Plan be considered
as an effective method of employee representation and collective bargaining?
Or, on the contrary, is it anything more than an elaborate structure designed to
create in the minds of the employees the belief that they possess something of
substance and value that enables them to deal with their employer on an equal
footing, so that they will be sufficiently content to resist the appeal of an out-
side labor union?
The Board concluded that the Council was dominated for several reasons, among them:
[W]hen a deadlock [between the employees and employer] is reached on any
matter, the employee representatives can do nothing. They possess no funds,
no organization to fall back upon, no mass support.
And since the Council had no independent financial support
its existence [is] entirely subject to the will of the [company]. If it chooses
to withdraw its support, the Plan collapses at once. If it chooses to continue
its support, the Plan continues. The choice . . . is thus a choice that rests
with the [company) and not with the employees.
International Harvester Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 310, 347-51 (1936).
70. See Dennison Mfg. Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 1012 (1967).
71. See, e.g., Stackpole Carbon Co., 6 N.L.R.B. 171 (1938), enforced, 105 F.2d 167
(3d Cir. 1939).
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employees' pay for time spent at such meetings. 2 Illegal domination or
interference has also been found where the employer initiated or imple-
mented the organization,73 participated in the drafting of its rules or pro-
cedures,7' participated in its meetings,"' or selected or controlled its
membership.76
Assessed in terms of these specific prohibitions and viewed against
the basic policy underlying § 8(a) (2), the team is clearly a dominated
and supported labor organization. Employers conceive and implement
it as an organizational form; the employer has the power to destroy it as
the basic productive unit and to substitute some other form of productive
organization; the employer dictates the § 2(5) subject matter with which
the team is allowed to concern itself; the employer fully compensates team
members for all deliberations relating to § 2(5) matters since they all
occur on company time ;"7 and where the team has an employer-appointed
team leader, an agent of the employer participates in the team's daily
activities and deliberations.
Because the team possesses these features, it cannot be used by the
employees to exert economic pressure against the employer. The em-
ployer has the ultimate power to prevent the team from vigorously
pursuing employee interests in conflict with those of manage-
ment."8 Where there is an employer-appointed team leader, he could
72. See Wyman-Gordon Co. v. NLRB, 153 F2d 480 (7th Cir. 1946); Wahlgren
Magnetics, 132 N.LR.B. 1613 (1961).
73. Indiana Metal Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 202 F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 1953) (plan
established by the company even though original suggestion had come from employees) ;
NLRB v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 156 F.2d 706 (3d Cir. 1946) ("Junior Board" con-
ceived and implemented by management).
74. NLRB v. Standard Coil Prods. Co., 224 F.2d 465 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 902 (1955) (management initiated procedures and then notified employees of their
existence).
75. [C]ollective bargaining is an activity, presupposing that the employees
shall have opportunity in the absence of the employer to canvass their grievances,
formulate their demands in common, and instruct an advocate who they believe
will best press their suit.
NLRB v. Stow Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d 900, 904 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 964
(1955).
76. See NLRB v. American Furnace Co., 158 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1946) (commit-
tee members appointed by employer's supervisors); NLRB v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co.,
156 F.2d 706 (3d Cir. 1946) (employees elected to "Junior Board," but nominees were
subject to the approval of the company's directors).
77. Team deliberations on company time, if a team leader participates as an agent
of the employer, might not constitute illegal support because of the proviso in § 8(a) (2) :
"[A]n employer shall not be prohibited from permitting employees to confer with him
during working hours without loss of time or pay . . . . " 29 US.C. § 158(a) (2)
(1970). Of course, the team leader's participation would constitute illegal domination in
this case.
78. Could a new manager with more conventional ideas destroy the "Topeka
[team] system"? Actually, clever as the technological designs are, there is
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impede discussion critical of company policies. Regardless of whether
there is a team leader, the employer could withdraw all § 2(5) matters
from team consideration, or he could forbid the collective discussion of
such matters on company time. More drastically, the employer could pre-
vent, altogether, the association of team members during company time by
introducing an alternative form of productive organization, such as the
conventional assembly line.
Furthermore, the implementation of the team effectively inhibits the
employees from attempting to construct their own labor organization. In
fact, one of the intended effects of the team and related management
theories is to prevent unionization."9 The team provides resolution
machinery capable of accommodating minor disputes or grievances and
thereby pre-empts the creation of an independent labor organizition. The
incompatibility of unionism and the team concept is reflected in the man-
agement practice of implementing the team form of organization through
the opening of a new plant rather than in a plant already in operation. The
rationale for this practice, as explained by one management official, is
that "[n]o power groups will exist within the organization that create an
anti-management posture." s
Under the cases delineating the traditional meaning of employer
domination, then, implementation of the team concept would be a clear
violation of § 8(a) (2) whenever a team satisfied the § 2(5) definitional
requirements of a "labor organization." In recent years, however, the
United States Courts of Appeals, by employing a three-pronged analysis,
have given a new policy emphasis to § 8(a) (2) which may undercut the
conclusiveness of this determination. The Seventh Circuit departed from
the policy underlying the Newport News approach in its decision in
Chicago Rawhide Manufacturing Co. v. NLRB. s" Emphasizing, instead,
the policy of cooperation, Chicago Rawhide and its progeny reflect a will-
ingness of the courts to be influenced in § 8(a) (2) cases by the existence
of a harmonious relationship between employees and employers.8 2 In ac-
cordance with the new policy emphasis on cooperation, these courts have
nothing to preclude the use of orthodox autocratic techniques.
Jenkins, supra note 3, at 81.
79. [J]ob enrichment in the nonunion organization is harnessing talent in a
manner that gives a competitive advantage to that organization, and also offers
the only realistic strategy for preventing the unionization of its work force.
Myers, supra note 4, at 38.
80. Ketchum, supra note 13, at 4.
81. 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955).
82. See 221 F.2d at 170. See also Hotpoint Co. v. NLRB, 289 F.2d 683, 685 (7th
Cir. 1961); Coppus Eng'r Corp. v. NLRB, 240 F.2d 564, 573 (1st Cir. 1957).
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developed an approach to § 8 (a) (2) which permits employer involvement
which is clearly illegal under the Newport News analysis. Since the team
concept, if successfully implemented by the employer, promotes harmony
and cooperation between employees and their employer, this harmony
could be a major factor in the decision of a court assessing the team under
§ 8(a) (2). For this reason it is necessary to explore the limits of the cir-
cuit courts' approach to ascertain, first, whether the team would be per-
missible and, second, whether it should be.
As articulated in Chicago Rawhide, the new approach hinges on
three elements: (1) a subjective standard for domination, from the point
of view of the employees;3 (2) a distinction between illegal "support,"
and cooperation or aid which does not involve "control;"'- and (3) dis-
tinctions between actual domination or interference which is illegal, and
potential domination or interference which the court stated was not a viola-
tion because it was always implicit in the employee-employer relation-
ship.8" Operating together, these three elements seem to change the tradi-
tional § 8(a) (2) analysis in two ways. First, use of a subjective standard
for domination shifts the focus from the institution of the labor organiza-
tion to the individual employees. Second, distinctions (2) and (3) shift
from scrutiny of the structural relationship between the employer and the
labor organization to scrutiny of the specific impact of employer conduct
on the employees.
These shifts, although they are not absolute, " are reflected in some
83. 221 F.2d at 168. The evolution of the subjective standard for domination is
marked by some peculiar leaps in logic. The standard was first announced in NLRB v.
Thompson Prods., Inc., 130 F.2d 362, 368 (6th Cir. 1942). There, the court used as its
authority the following language from International Ass'n of Machinists, Lodge 35 v.
NLRB, 311 U.S. 72 (1940), which, although it makes employee belief that the organiza-
tion is dominated an important factor, does not make employee belief in general the
standard for domination:
[W]here the employees would have just cause to believe that solicitors pro-
fessedly for a labor organization were acting for and on behalf of the manage-
ment, the Board would be justified in concluding that they did not have the
complete and unhampered freedom of choice which the Act contemplates.
311 U.S. at 80.
The court in Thompson Products used the subjective standard to uphold Board find-
ings of domination, but the possibility of using the standard to set aside Board findings
of domination was raised in NLRB v. Tappan Stove Co., 174 F.2d 1007 (6th Cir. 1949).
Noting that "[t]he Supreme Court has repeatedly admonished the courts of appeal as to
their limited power of review of fact findings of the labor board," the court, which was
impressed with the "friendly labor relationship" between the employer and employees,
reluctantly enforced a Board order calling for the disestablishment of a dominated labor
organization. Id. at 1008-09. In so doing, however, it indicated that it would have pre-
ferred to find the organization not dominated under the subjective standard. Id. at 1014.
84. 221 F.2d at 167.
85. Id. at 167-68.
86. The court continued to speak, in places, of dominated "labor organizations."
However, it seems to have equated the concept of a dominated labor organization with
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of the court's statements in Chicago Rawhide. In establishing its land-
mark distinction between illegal support and permissible cooperation, the
court stated:
Support, even though innocent, can be identified because it con-
stitutes at least some degree of control or influnce. Cooperation
only assists the employees or their bargaining representative in
carrying out their independent intention."
And where distinguishing actual from potential domination, it stated:
Words and actions which might dominate the employees
in their choice of a bargaining agent do not constitute domina-
tion proscribed by the Act unless the employees are actually
dominated.8
Other courts have used this approach expansively. Courts have found
cooperation but not illegal support where the employer has provided the
organization with office space and furniture, paper supplies, printing,
duplicating and typing services ;8 where the employer has prepared for the
organization its notices, election information and ballots ;" and where the
employer has allowed internal meetings of labor organizations on company
time without deducting from employees' pay for time spent."' Similarly,
courts have found only potential rather than actual domination where the
employer permitted meetings on company time but controlled their
length;" where the employer repeatedly ordered an employee rep-
sentative not to concern himself with disputes arising in departments
which he did not represent and, further, not to report on such matters to
his own department ;"8 where the employees' organization submitted pro-
posed changes in its bylaws to management for approval;94 where a pro-
vision of the organization's bylaws allowed the foreman to participate in
that of dominated employees and, in so doing, avoided the issue of structural independ-
ence of the organization. This mistaken equation is apparent from the court's statement
that potential domination is not illegal because it is inherent in the employee-employer
relationship. The fact that the employee-employer relationship does involve the potential
for employer domination of an individual employee does not mean that the relationship
also involves the potential for employer domination of a truly independent labor organi-
zation. The labor organization itself should be independent of the employer-employee
relationship. See note 16 supra.
87. 221 F.2d at 167 (emphasis added).
88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. Hotpoint Co. v. NLRB, 289 F.2d 683 (7th Cir. 1961).
90. Modem Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1967).
91. NLRB v. Magic Slacks, Inc., 314 F.2d 844 (7th Cir. 1963).
92. Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 394 F.2d 915 (6th Cir. 1968).
93. Id.
94. Hotpoint Co. v. NLRB, 289 F.2d 683 (7th Cir. 1961).
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calling departmental meetings of the organization and permitted him to
submit reports of the meetings to his supervisor ;"5 and where the employer
had the power to change the organizational status of the employee repre-
sentatives by transferring them to another department9 Through applica-
tion of this expansion of -the Chicago Rawhide analysis, arguments assert-
ing the legality of the team form of organization may succeed by emphasiz-
ing the team's promotion of employer-employee cooperation.
However, a possible limit upon the persuasiveness of such arguments
was established by the Seventh Circuit itself in NLRB v. Ampex Corp.7
There, the court rejected the respondent's contention that the labor organ-
ization in question was permissible under Chicago Rawhide and its prog-
eny with the following statement:
We have examined these cases and find that the organization
involved in each had some reasonable claim to being an inde-
pendent entity composed of employees and distinct from man-
agement. Not so here, and we deem the cases inapplicable. 8
Under this standard, the team would still be considered supported
and dominated. As it meets only on company time, deliberates only on
matters which are delegated by the management, and owes its very exis-
tence to a management experiment, it has no reasonable claim to being
independent. Further, where the team leader participates as an agent of
the employer, it is not an organization entirely distinct from management.
However, the Ampex qualification of the three-pronged approach
enunciated in Chicago Rawhide is not logically required. A court
strongly motivated by the concern for preserving a cooperative relation-
ship between employers and employees might ignore Ampex and use these
three elements of analysis to find the team permissible under § 8 (a) (2).
If read literally, they might be interpreted as eliminating all concern for
structural relationships and substituting concern only for the employees
as individuals. Under this interpretation, § 8(a) (2) might be deemed
violated only upon a showing that the employer has actually influenced
employees to change their position on issues which are traditionally the
subject of collective bargaining. If a showing of actual employer domin-
ation of particular employees is required, a § 8(a) (2) violation in the
team context would be extremely difficult to establish. The employer has
specifically designed the team to accommodate greater employee participa-
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 442 F.2d 82 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971).
98. Id. at 85.
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tion and influence than is possible in the conventional workplace. Within
the team each employee enjoys a greater freedom of involvement than his
traditional counterpart.
Thum, if a court were to focus exclusively on the individual team
members as opposed to the team as an entity, it could conceivably find that
there is no illegal domination. However, to take this position, a court
would be forced to abandon the literal meaning of § 8(a) (2) which is to
protect and guarantee the independence of a labor organization, as well as
to violate the policy behind that provision as framed by Congress and in-
terpreted by the NLRB and the Supreme Court.9 As written, § 8(a) (2)
does not directly protect the individual employee; it protects, instead, the
independent labor organization which, as the vehicle for collective em-
ployee action, enables the employees to protect themselves.'
CONCLUSION
Although the team form of organization seems to accomplish very
positive results in promoting employee satisfaction on the job, it is a clear
violation of the Act. A possible solution to the domination problem which
would preserve the positive features of the team would be to require the
team to limit its concern to subjects not enumerated in § 2(5) ; if it is
not a labor organization, there can be no illegal domination.' Such a
requirement would allow continued team involvement in problems relat-
ing to production which have traditionally been reserved for unilateral
management decision,' while prohibiting team consideration of the §
2(5) employee interests which the Act seeks to protect by providing for
employee self-organization and collective bargaining.
Despite its positive features, a team which considers § 2 (5) matters
cannot be permitted because it is a dominated labor organization. Na-
tional labor policy assumes that the interest of employees and employers
conflict in many areas, and further, that the conflict is most satisfactorily
resolved when the two deal together as independent entities, each advanc-
ing its interest to an extent determined by its economic strength. Subject
99. See notes 64-69 supra & text accompanying. See also note 16 supra.
100. "The Wagner Act became law on the floodtide of the belief that the conflict-
ing interests of management and worker can be adjusted only by private negotiations,
backed, if necessary, by economic weapons, without the intervention of law." Cox,
supra note 2, at 322.
101. See NLRB v. Cleveland Trust Co., 214 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1954). See also
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 80 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1948) (Board disestablishment order does
not prevent organization from continuing operations as something other than a labor
organization).
102. The requirement would permit, for example, implementation of many features
of the theory of job enlargement. See note 8 supra.
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-as it is to management's control, the team precludes the form of dispute
resolution envisioned by the Act. It amounts, instead, to an interest resolu-
tion mechanism controlled by the employer. Employees are involved not
because they have a right to participate or because they have the strength
to demand recognition; instead, they are involved because the employer
has invited them to participate. In short, the ultimate protection of their
interests is traceable not to their own strength but to the benevolence of
their employer. Before employee interests are entrusted for protection
to the team form of organization, the legislature should have the oppor-
tunity to study once again the relationship between the fundamental in-
terests of employees and employers and decide if those interests can be
satisfactorily reconciled by a mechanism within the control of the employer.
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